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Abstract:  The Security Protocol Game is a highly interactive game for teaching secure data communications protocols. 
Students use the game to simulate security protocols and explore possible attacks against them. The power of the game 
lies in the representation it provides for secret and public key cryptography – a unique combination of game rules and 
playing pieces has been devised that accurately represents the mathematical capabilities of cryptographic systems. Using 
pen and paper, envelopes and printed game pieces, students can simulate a wide range of computer network security 
protocols including well-known protocols such as SSL and Pretty Good Privacy. Such simulations enable students to 
gain a deep understanding of how the protocols operate and how protocol design affects security of the protocol. Student 
response to the game is positive and engaging. It has been successfully used with both information technology students 
and management students. This paper presents the game briefly followed by analysis and discussion of a recent survey of 




Internet security is now an important aspect of information technology in business applications. 
Internet security is dependent upon two key elements. Cryptographic methods are used to secure data 
for transmission, and secure communication protocols provide the framework for communication. 
Information technology students need to understand both these concepts in order to properly 
understand secure data communications. 
 
Students often have difficulty understanding secure communication protocols. Unlike other data 
communication protocols, security protocols must be designed with an adversary in mind – an 
intruder whose intent is to subvert the communication. The design of security protocols is largely 
driven by the need to prevent intrusion. Subtle errors in a protocol may make it vulnerable to attack. 
The Security Protocol Game (Hamey 2003) provides a simulation environment where students can 
study various protocols and explore the possible attacks against them, providing a real understanding 
of protocol operation and design. In this paper, we present an overview of the game results of a 
survey of student response to the game. 
 
The Security Protocol Game uses a simple representation of public key (Diffie and Hellman 1976) 
and secret key cryptographic systems and related algorithms. The representation uses coloured 
envelopes, coloured paper and coloured key tokens to incorporate the key properties of the 
cryptographic systems into the game. For example, to encrypt a message, a player encloses it in a 
coloured envelope. This represents the confidentiality provided by encrypting the message – other 
players cannot read a message that is enclosed in an envelope. The rules of the game complement the 
representation. For example, a player may only open an envelope if they hold the appropriate 
cryptographic key token, simulating the mathematical requirement that a player can only decrypt a 
message if they have the cryptographic key. 
 
The idea of using physical representations to explain security protocols is not new. Chaum (1985) 
uses a representation involving envelopes and rubber stamps to explain blind signature schemes. 
Bell, Thimbleby, Fellows, Witten and Koblitz (1999) use a representation involving a chain and 
padlocks to explain Diffie-Hellman key exchange (Diffie and Hellman 1976) to a non-technical 
audience. In neither case do the authors attempt to develop a representation that covers the diverse 
applications of public-key and secret-key cryptographic systems. The Security Protocol Game 
provides such a representation that can be used to study both simple security protocols and real-world 
secure communication protocols. 
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We have used the game for a number of years in teaching secure communications protocols as part 
of an undergraduate unit on computer networks. The unit covers computer network architecture at all 
levels, with a focus on the Internet. Secure communications protocols are an important but relatively 
small part of the unit. Recently, we surveyed students in this unit concerning their response to the use 
of the game. Our purpose was to identify strengths and weaknesses of the game for future 
development, and to evaluate it as an educational tool. The results of this survey are presented below. 
 
Overview of the game 
 
Discussions of cryptographic methods commonly involve three parties: Alice and Bob, who wish to 
communicate, and an intruder, Trudy, who seeks to subvert the security of the communications 
between Alice and Bob. Some protocols introduce a trusted party variously known as Big Brother or 
the key distribution centre. The Security Protocol Game uses the conventional roles of Alice, Bob 
and Trudy, with Gavin as the trusted authority. The game adds the role of Colin, the copying engine. 
Colin is not a part of the communication protocols. He provides copying and computational services 
to the other players, representing the innate capabilities of computer systems to produce identical 
copies of arbitrary messages, and to perform other relevant computations. 
 
Students play the game in groups of 4-5 players. Within each group, one student is selected to play 
each of Alice and Bob, the two communicating parties. Another student is selected to play Gavin. 
The same student may also take the role of Colin. The remaining student or students take the role of 
Trudy the intruder. 
 
The game commences with the students seated around a table: Alice and Bob at opposite ends, 
Trudy on one side and Gavin opposite her. The students select a game scenario to play, and a 
protocol to use in the scenario. In a typical scenario, Alice wishes to purchase computer software 
from Bob over the Internet using her credit card for payment. The students may choose to simulate 
the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS; formerly called SSL and used to secure transactions on 
the world wide web) for this scenario, or other protocols, some of which are vulnerable to various 
attacks. The protocols involve messages being passed between Alice, Bob and Gavin. All messages 
are actually passed via Trudy, who may attempt to attack the protocol by monitoring or modifying 
the messages. The students find this a stimulating group activity as they help each other run the 
protocol correctly and try to think up ways to subvert it. 
 
Cryptographic systems and their representation 
 
Two important types of cryptographic systems are secret key methods (symmetric algorithms) and 
public key methods. Secret key cryptography is the conventional form in which Alice and Bob use 
the same key to encrypt E and decrypt D a plain text message for secure transmission. In the Security 
Protocol Game, a plain text message is written on white paper (see Figure 1). Secret keys are 
represented by coloured key tokens. Alice ‘encrypts’ the plain text message by enclosing it in an 
envelope of the same colour as the key. A player must hold the colour matched key token to open the 
envelope. Using secret key cryptography, Alice and Bob can ensure that the message is not readable 
by Trudy (confidentiality), that it cannot be modified during transmission (integrity) and that it 
originates from a person who knows the secret key (authentication). 
 
Public key cryptography differs from secret key methods in that encryption and decryption use the 
same algorithm P but different keys for encryption and decryption. Each party has their own pair of 
keys. One of the keys (for example, Bob’s key EB) is public knowledge while the other key DB is 
private. In the Security Protocol Game, coloured key tokens are used to represent private and public 
keys, and a matching coloured envelope is used for encryption with a public key. 
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Figure 1: Secure transmission from Alice to Bob using secret key cryptography 
 
Public key cryptography can also be used for authentication. Bob encrypts a message using his 
private key DB and other players can then decrypt it with the public key EB. In the Security Protocol 
Game, the holder of a private key authenticates a message by writing it on coloured paper. Since the 
public key is assumed to be public knowledge, this representation explicitly allows Trudy to read the 
message, although she may not modify it.  
 
A variety of other key concepts of secure communications protocols can also be represented in the 
game, including public key certificates, message digests and digital signatures, transmitting 
encrypted keys and key exchange techniques. Hamey (2003) presents the game in greater detail. 
 
Using the game 
 
We have used the game as an exercise for postgraduate management students and as a tutorial 
activity for third year computing students in the unit Computer Networks. In the computing unit, the 
game was used for two tutorial hours. In the first tutorial hour, the tutor demonstrated the game on a 
simple example, and the students subsequently played up to two rounds of the game. In the second 
hour, the students had become familiar with the representation and were able to explore more 




To evaluate student response to the game, we conducted a survey of students who used the game in 
our third year undergraduate Computer Networks unit. This is the first computer networks unit 
undertaken by these students. It provides an overview of computer network architecture with detailed 
study of issues at each level. Secure communications protocols are an important part of the unit, but 
receive only limited lecture coverage. To complete the presentation, students experience two tutorial 
hours with the Security Protocol Game. The survey was conducted during the second tutorial hour. 
 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain student evaluation of the game, and to identify 
issues for further investigation in future work. 71 students completed the questionnaire, representing 
half of the unit enrolment. The response rate was primarily related to attendance at tutorials – most of 
the students present in the tutorials chose to complete the questionnaire. 
 
The questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part contained nine statements that students 
responded to using a Likert scale from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (5), with the option 
to select ‘not applicable’. The second part contained three open-ended questions about the game and 
an additional opportunity for students to comment on other aspects of the unit unrelated to the game. 
 
The survey was developed and conducted with the assistance of the Centre for Professional 
Development of Macquarie University. The centre regularly conducts student evaluation surveys of 
units of study. The administration of the survey was in accordance with procedures familiar to the 
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students, except that the students were informed that this survey was part of a research project and 
that results of the survey would be published. 
 
Likert statements 
The following nine statements were provided to measure student response to the game. 
• I enjoyed playing the security protocol game. 
• I was able to understand the rules of the game. 
• The game helped me understand how security protocols work. 
• After playing the game, I understand better how SSL works. 
• The game showed me how important it is to design security protocols properly. 
• The game helped me understand how to design a security protocol properly. 
• The game helped me understand the lecture material better. 
• The security protocol game is a worthwhile learning experience. 
• I would understand computing better if other units used activities like the game. 
 
These statements were designed to measure student response in the areas of enjoyment, 
understanding of the game itself, understanding of learning goals, and perceived value of game-based 
learning. The primary goal of the game is to help students understand how security protocols work 
and the potential attacks against them – SSL is used as an example protocol. The game models a 
credit card purchase over the Internet, so we expect students to gain an appreciation of the 
importance of security protocol design through seeing weak protocols broken. It is possible for 
students to design and test their own protocols, but students often do not have time in this unit to 
explore this aspect, so we expect fewer students to learn about protocol design. The last two 
questions probe the students’ evaluation of the game as a learning experience. 
 
Open-ended questions 
The open-ended questions were designed to provide feedback about the strengths and weaknesses of 
the game as a tool, and to identify the students’ learning focus. The three questions were as follows. 
• What is the best aspect of the security protocol game? 
• What would you like to see improved in the game? 




Student responses to the Likert questions were positive, but not strong. Average response values 
ranged from 3.5 (halfway between ‘neutral’ and ‘agree’) to 4.0 (‘agree’) with some students strongly 
agreeing and others strongly disagreeing with individual statements. 
 
Students generally enjoyed the game (average value 3.9) and valued it as a learning experience 
(average value 4.0). More than 80% of students agreed or strongly agreed that they would understand 
computing better if other units used activities like the game (average value 4.0).  
 
With respect to learning outcomes, 85% of students agreed or strongly agreed that the game 
showed them how important it is to design security protocols properly (average response 4.0). 76% 
of students agreed or strongly agreed that the game helped them understand how security protocols 
work (average response 3.9). 62% of students agreed or strongly agreed that the game helped them 
understand the lecture material (average response 3.6). 61% agreed or strongly agreed that it helped 
them understand how to design a security protocol properly (average response 3.6). 56% of students 
agreed or strongly agreed that the game helped them understand better how SSL works (average 
response 3.5). 
 
Understanding of the rules appears to have been an obstacle for some of the students. Only 73% of 
students agreed or strongly agreed that they were able to understand the rules of the game, while 7% 
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disagreed. The open-ended question responses also included comments on the rules. We believe this 
is an area for improvement that would benefit the students significantly. 
 
The responses to the Likert questions indicate that the students believe they benefited from using 
the game as a learning experience, that they achieved significant learning outcomes and that they 
believe they would benefit from similar activities in other parts of their course. 
 
We also analysed the Likert question responses for differences between tutorial groups. We found 
that students who were taught by tutors with prior experience of using the game responded more 
positively to all questions than students who were taught by tutors using the game for the first time. 
The differences were between 0.5 and 0.9 in the average response. This result indicates that the 
tutor’s ability to guide the students in their use of the game is important for student success. We 
believe that improving the written presentation of the game (the rules) may reduce this difference, 
but we believe that it would also be beneficial to give the tutors practical experience with playing the 
game themselves in a group before they take their tutorial classes.  
 
Open-ended responses 
In response to the open-ended questions, the students wrote 123 distinct comments. These were 
collated and classified to identify trends and issues. 
 
With regard to the best aspect of the security protocol game, 44 responses were provided. The 
most common response, given by 15 students, related to learning and understanding security 
protocols or the attacks upon them. 7 students identified group interaction as the best aspect of the 
game while 6 students focused on the hands-on approach provided by the game. Many other 
responses were received ranging over aspects of the game such as its visual appeal, the fun or 
challenge aspect, and the importance of security on the Internet. 
 
37 responses were received concerning improvements to the game. The dominant response was a 
request for improvement in the clarity and presentation of the rules (11 students). This area was also 
identified for improvement by the Likert question responses. The students gave specific suggestions 
for improvement. We plan to work with a student focus group to develop a rules document that is 
easier for the students to use.  
 
7 students requested solutions to the game – specific strategies for Trudy to break particular 
protocols. Such solutions are provided to tutors but have not been provided to the students. A student 
focus group could be used to identify how much information to provide so that students can explore 
attacks on the protocols while still facing a suitable learning challenge. 
 
7 students wanted more time devoted to the game, expressing the desire to understand the more 
difficult concepts that the game supports. A further 7 students requested a computerised version of 
the game, so that they could play it online. 2 students identified problems they experienced with 
group interaction. 
 
For the question asking the students to identify the most important thing they learned from playing 
the game, 37 responses were received. The dominant response (12 students) was that they learned 
how to attack, break or ‘hack’ protocols. 8 students identified learning how the protocols work as the 
most important thing, with a further 3 students specifically focusing on learning about SSL. 5 
students said the most important thing they learned was related to the security risks of using the 
Internet and 3 identified the most important thing they learned as being the importance of security 
protocols. With a couple of humorous exceptions, the learning outcomes identified by the students 
were desirable learning outcomes for the unit. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Security Protocol Game is a stimulating group activity that helps students understand the design 
and operation of protocols for secure data communications. The game provides a rich environment 
capable of simulating both simple and complex protocols. A student survey confirms that the game 
assists students to achieve relevant learning outcomes including understanding the importance of 
proper design of security protocols, how security protocols work and the attacks against them. The 
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